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Abstract
Regulatory reform in EU transport policy has forced  urban public transport authorities to operate
increasingly under a market regime. The EU policy favours in particular a system of limited
competition through the granting of concessions to public transport operators. This paper seeks to
identify the success conditions for local public transport systems in a sample of 22 European cities. On
the basis of extensive field research a systematic  performance table of urban public transport systems
in these cities is created with the aim to investigate the impact of four classes of critical success factors
on the performance of these systems. In the empirical part both a qualitative interpretative analysis and
a recently developed tool from artificial  intelligente,  viz. rough set analysis, is deployed in order to
derive policy relevant conclusions.
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1. Setting the Scene
European integration is a fuzzy term comprising a wide variety of socio-politica1 elements,
geographical settings and institutional-economie mechanisms. The European Union has originated
from  an uncoordinated patchwork of different driving forces, missing networks and self-centred
regulatory regimes. The pace  towards more coordinated polities,  for instance, in the area of a common
agricultural policy (CAP) or a common transport policy (CTP), has been long lasting and sometimes
fi-ustrating. Nevertheless, Europe is gradually shaping its own politica1 face, a development that
urgently needs  to take place  in the light of the foreseen entry of the accession countries (see also
Commission of the European Communities 2001).
One of the policy areas  in which the European Commission has been active  is transportation
policy. Policy development in this area is govemed by two genera1 principles laid down in the Treaty
of Europe, viz. the subsidiarity principle  and the proportionality principle. The fïrst principle
stipulates: “In areas,  which do not fa11  within its exclusive  competente,  the Community  shall  take
action.  (...),  only  tf and in so far as the objectives  of the proposed action  cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can  therefore, by reason of the scale  or eflects  of the proposed
action,  be better achieved by the Community “, while the second  principle  has to be interpreted as
follows: “Any  action  by the Community shall  not go beyond what is necessary to achieve  the objective
of this Treaty  “.  Within this overall framework  a common European policy for the transportation sector
is being developed.
One of the foundation stones of the CTP is to introduce more market orientation in the
transportation sector in order to increase the efficiency in this rather  old-fashioned system. Various
mechanisms based on policy devolution are at present envisaged, in particular decentralisation,
deregulation and privatisation. Through a strong adherente  to market principles the transport sector is
expected to offer an effective  contribution to an efficiency rise in the European unification process.
Such  a policy is not only needed for cross-border transportation (e.g., the railway sector, the aviation
sector or intemational freight transport), but also  for public transport at various geographical scales
ranging fiom interregional to local  transport. The European Commission is at present developing a
comprehensive framework  of appropriate regulations and financial incentives in order to favour the
performance of public transport with the help of market incentives. From the three possible ideal-
typical organization forms of public transport, viz. a public monopoly with closed  markets,  a system of
limited competition and a system of entirely deregulated markets,  the Commission supports a
fiamework based on limited competition.
The present study aims to test whether the gradual transition towards a system of limited
competition for urban public transport (or urban mass transit) has been successful in terms of a better
achievement of the targets set by the public transport authorities. In addition, the study aims to identify
the critical success  factors  for the achievement of the success  (or the lack  of success)  of public
transport systems in various urban regions in Europe based on both a taxonomie  interpretation and a
meta-analytic comparison.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a concise introduction into European policy on
(urban) public transport is offered; particular attention wil1 be given to various policy objectives which
serve as a frame of reference for judging the actual achievement of urban public transport systems.
Next, we wil1 offer an overview of various organizational forms of urban public transport systems in
Section 3. As a step towards a practica1 policy analysis Section 4 wil1 map out  the various critical
success  factors  for these achievements. In Section 5 the data base for our taxonomie  analysis of
various European urban public transport systems wil1 be presented. A substantive interpretation of
empirical findings  and results of a more rigorous  analytical method for handling smal1 sample
qualitative data in comparative  case study research, viz. rough set analysis, based on meta-analytical
principles, are contained  in Section 6; the resulting policy rules wil1 be interpreted as well. And
finally,  the paper wil1 be concluded with some policy perspectives.
2. Basic Elements of European Urban Public Transport Policy
Transport is one of the connecting principles of European integration policy (see Nijkamp et al.
1998). This applies to al1 geographical levels ranging from intemational to local. For example, at the
intemational level, the policy on Trans European Networks (TENs)  is of utmost importante. At the
local level, the EU competente  regarding the operation of local networks is limited by the above-
mentioned principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, but the genera1 objective  of favouring
efficiency in European transport systems applies here as well, beside the tùlfilment  of socio-economie
objectives (such  as employment generation) and environmental objectives (e.g., reduction in COZ
emissions in the transport sector).
Urban transport is generally seen as a public service of great importante. At the individual leve1 it
is a service that meets  the needs  of mobile citizens, while at a societal leve1 it contributes  to quality of
life and sustainability. The EU directorate-genera1 on Transport has even positioned public transport as
a crucial  service for European citizens (see DG Transport 1996),  witness the following statements:
“Needs  of citizens are put at the centre  of decisions about transport provisions”, and: “Ideally,  public
transport should  be accessible,  aflordable and available to al1 citizens. Financial and technical
considerations may constrain this, but the Commission believes that the goal is important and worth of
debate... “. The Commission’s policy, therefore, is focussed  on a higher use intensity of public
transport.
Clearly, a major weak element in the provision of high quality urban and suburban public
transport is the low transparancy in the organization of European public transport. The organizational
models range from  public enterprises (with a dominant role of public authorities in ownership,
planning and operation) to private enterprises in deregulated markets.  Public monopolies have become
notoriously inefficiently operating firms due to lack of incentives in a protected market. Privately
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organized firms in the public transport market are assumed to operate  much more efficiently, but this
efficiency rise may be offset by a loss in terms of integration of public transport systems (see also  Van
Ooststroom 1998). Consequently, the European Commission has formulated a blend of these two
extreme forms that might offer a better compliance with the needs  of both citizens and society at large.
This organizational mix presupposes a light regulation, which may favour the achievement of
production efficiency, tost efficiency, socio-economie objectives and client orientation.
The semi-market model advocated  by the Commission is based on a system of concessions to be
granted on a competitive basis by responsible public authorities to various public transport operators.
The regulatory and operational framework of the services to be offered has to be specified  by the
public authority. This model has two major consequences. First, it leads to a shift in the mission of a
public transport operator from a duty  to deliver a service toward the establishment of a contract
between two parties, viz. the public authority and the operator, so that the two roles  cannot coincide
anymore. Clearly, in the accompanying legal framework the rights and duties of both parties (e.g.,
geographical coverage of the transport service, frequency and tariff structure)  have to be specified.  In
the second  place,  the concession model introduces  clearly market incentives, as a concession has only
a limited time span and a new concession is subject to a cal1  for tender. The new regulatory framework
of the EU in the area of public transport comprises the following genera1 objectives (see DG Transport
1996):
- to entourage  increases in use ofpublic transport;
- to entourage  system integration andfulfilment  ofpublic service requirements;
- to establish incentives for service providers and planning authorities to improve accessibility,
eficiency,  quality and user friendliness of public transport systems;
- to promote  financial  conditions required for making  public transport services more attractive,
both for public andprivate investors;
- to ensure minimum requirements in respect of the qualifications  of staff  thus guaranteeing
high levels  of reliability, safety and security;
- to safeguard jlexibility  in relation to specijc national,  regional and local  priorities and the
particularities of national legal  systems.
These objectives would,stimulate  a strong public transport sector in Europe and eliminate existing
barriers that induce  inefficiencies. The operationalisation of the above principles at a local scale  is
mainly a responsibility of public authorities at a local or regional level.
Another possible govemment intervention in the public transport sector may be based on the
provision of subsidies or loans, from  either the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) or the
Cohesion Fund (CF). Financial means  from the ERDF can be obtained in order to stimulate small-  and
medium-size enterprise activities, to favour generally productive  investments, to improve weak
infiastructures  or to entourage local development. Support from  the CF serves to favour socio-
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economie  integration in Europe, inter alia for the improvement of accessibility or connectivity to the
TENs.
3. The Organization of Local Public Transport Systems
Local public transport (LPT) systems - in EU countries and world-wide - exhibit an enormous
variety of appearances in terms of organization and relationships with stakeholders, as wel1  as of
planning and control  systems. In the framework  of our study we wil1 deploy a practica1 classifïcation
of LPT systems on the basis of the ‘right of initiutive ‘ , where  the fundamental and legal decision on
how  to organize an LPT system rests either with a public authority or with the market. In the first case,
the transport authority has a forma1 monopoly, whereas in the second  case LPT initiatives originate
from  the - often  anonymous - free market system (though restricted by legislation and regulatory
measures). Figure 1 offers a systematic  tûrther distinction of the possible organizational structures  of
the above major classification.
The LPT system is usually operating in a complex force field with several key players. In our
taxonomie  approach we make the following distinction:
l consumers/users  (C)
l local voters (K)
l local authorities (A)
l public transport tïrms or operators (0)
This list of stakeholders can be used as the basis for an integrated typology of the two above-
mentioned initiatives in relation to entry conditions to the LPT market.
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Figure 1. Taxonomy of LPT initiatives
The parties involved with LPT systems (i.e., A, C, K, 0) execute  different roles  and functions on
the market for collective passenger transport. In particular, the following activities and tasks can be
distinguished:
- supply (delivery) of LPT services to clients (D)
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- payment for LPT service provision (P)
- democratie  (voting) impact on quality and quantity of LPT services or systems (V)
- public regulation of supply andor demand  of LPT services (R).
The execution of these tasks and roles  brings the four above-mentioned parties together, as these items
make up the linking pins between the parties concemed. The linkage structure between these four
classes of stakeholders can now schematically be mapped out  using a connectivity matrix (see Figure
2).
Figure 2. A connectivity matrix between the
stakeholders in LPT systems
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The nature  of the linkage between A, C, K and 0 in a given LPT constellation can be denoted by
filling the entries of the matrix with the corresponding relevant items D, P, V or R. In this way, a
systematic  way of depicting (almost)  al1 relevant LPT constellations is achieved. Of course, there are
many organizational forms of stylised linkage pattems. By way of illustration we wil1 present here one
arbitrary possible LPT constellation, namely one based on a LPT initiative from the market
accompanied by a system of public authorisation. The corresponding connectivity matrix is in this
case the following (see Figure 3).
Figure 3. Connectivity structure  of a market-based  LPT
constellation govemed by a system
of public authorisation
In an ideal-typical form this constellation can also be represented as follows (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Illustrative organization of an LPT market system under a regime ofa public authority
Needless to say, there are numerous types of LPT constellations that can be depicted by the
connectivity matrix in Figure 2 (see for a review also Van Egmond 2001). Systems of public
monopoly, subsidised LPT systems, competitive  tender procedures, selective  concessions, delegated
management, or public ownership can al1 systematically be handled in this way. This approach can be
extended by including as driving forces, besides extemal environmental factors, also different levels of
planning competente  in LPT systems, notably strategie,  tactical and operational planning. This wil1 be
ftn-ther  discussed in the next section.
4. Success  Factors  of LPT Systems
To increase the use and efficiency in LPT systems it is necessary to gain more insight into the
driving forces or determinants of the performance of such systems. Base on the various EU directives
referred to above, a subdivision may be made into two classes of objectives.  First, there are socio-
economie  performance criteria, in particular, the increase in the use of LPT systems, an improvement
in environmental quality conditions or a contribution to employment. In this framework, one may also
mention accessibility, quality, availability and affordability of LPT services. In the second place, there
are financial-economie  performance criteria, in particular intemal tost-efficiency and customer-
oriented effectiveness. This complex set of interlinked objectives/criteria for the functioning of LPT
systems is depicted in Figure 5. Clearly, the actual fulfilment of such policy goals would have to be
‘explained’ from a set of generic  and site-specific  background factors. The main indicator for policy
success  is the usage of local mass transit systems, which is a composite indicator of many underlying
policy-relevant criteria as described in Figure 5.
The performance of LPT systems is thus critically contingent upon a set of major driving forces
(critical success  conditions, abbreviated as CSCs).  These are:
0 extemal factors
0 strategie  factors
0 tactical factors
0 operational factors.
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We wil1 concisely describe these 4 CSCs.
- 1 E m p l o y m e n t  r
Figure 5. Interaction scheme of LPT objectives/criteria
A. External  CSCs
These factors cannot be controlled  by the LPT agency concemed. We wil1 distinguish here 3 major
extemal CSCs:
Al. population. This factor refers to the potential demand for LPT services and represents also an
efficiency indicator in relation to the critical mass of LPT users (including also the population
fi-om adjacent areas as wel1 as tourists).
A2. population densiq.  This factor is a proxy for the economies  of geographical density and
influences the type of LPT systems offered.
A3. population distribution. This factor refers in particular to the degree of uniformity or
heterogeneity in the geographical dispersion of people (e.g., a poly-nuclear  structure versus an
urban-rural dichotomy).
A4. incidental large urban manifestations.  Large urban manifestations such  as exhibitions, sports
events or cultural events exert a significant but ad hoc impact on the performance of LPT systems.
B. Strategie  CSCs
The goals of LPT systems are also influenced by strategie  factors determined by the various
stakeholders, in particular national, regional and local authorities. The strategie  factors distinguished
here are:
B 1. politica1 interest. In both publicly organized and market-oriented LPT systems public authorities
have a significant impact on the functioning of LPT systems through both regulating and
facilitating interventions.
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B2. speczjìc  LPT regulutions. Within the EU context of subsidiarity and proportionality many
initiatives have been developed which aim to improve the efficiency in the LPT sector.
Regulatory uncertainty may  have a negative impact on the LPT performance.
B3. integrated LPT and urban development. Urban and suburban development plans need to be
supported by suffïcient  availability of LPT systems. Such  an integration needs  to be realized on
both a structural and a project basis in order to attract suffícient  demand.
B4. coordination between LPT sector and public authorities. In this framework various tasks play a
role, such  as granting concessions, evaluation of licences by a responsible public authority,
provision of subsidies etc.
C. Tactical CSCs
The tactical leve1 addresses the question how  genera1 objectives  can be converted into an actual
implementation of LPT services. The following categories  can be distinguished:
Cl. orgunizational frumework. The organizational constellation refers in particular to the right of
initiative as spelt out  in Figure 1.
C2. financiul  fiamework.  The financial ramification is concemed with fïnancial aspects  of various
LPT tasks including the contractual aspects  (e.g., management contract, gross tost contract, net
tost contract).
C3. subsidies. These forms of financial support comprise both structural and non-structural subsidies.
The latter  category concerns fïnancial assistance for ad hoc projects.  Structural subsidies can be
subdivided into direct and indirect subsidies. Direct subsidies mean  a transfer to the LPT operator,
while indirect subsidies mean  a financial support via the user. Also  cross-subsidisation between
various public services or LPT services is possible.
C4. private-public partnership. This type of co-operation  between the public sector and the private
sector may relate  to both the operational execution of LPT services and the operation of LPT
infrastructure projects.  The motives for this co-operative  mode are inter alia: benefits  from
synergy, multifunctional development, blend of regulatory and business culture, better coverage
of market risks etc.
C5. symbiosis between LPT and other transport modes, A better integration may  generate  win-win
situations, e.g., in case of multi-modal passenger terminals.
D. Operational CSCs
At the operational leve1 we address  the actual supply and execution of LPT services, in particular
production and sales activities. The following factors  can be distinguished here:
Dl. variety in supply of LPT services. Relevant categories  are inter alia: bus, tram, metro, train, people
mover etc.
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D2. privilegedposition of LPT compared to other traffic.  Priority rules for LPT may offer this system
a more competitive position.
D3. den@  of LPT. Density may refer to both the service (e.g., frequency and intensity) and the
infrastructure.
D4. integration of LPT. The various LPT systems may have a higher  degree of cohesion through the
integration of fares, logistics, routing etc.
D5.  LPT marketing and information. This factor refers to the need for market and client orientation of
a modern LPT sector.
These CSCs  wil1 now be used as a test framework for a comparative  analysis of LPT systems in
various European cities.
5. Creation of the Data Base on LPT Systems in European Cities
The classification of the CSCs  discussed  in the previous section  needs  a further operationalisation
by indicating to which extent the various LPT objectives and CSCs  are realised in each  of the
European cities investigated in our study. The European case cities selected  in our study cover a wide
range of urban size categories  and of organizational/regulatory frameworks  and offer a representative
cross-section of different urban public transport constellations. This wil1 allow a comparison of both
urban regions of similar sizes  but functioning  under different arrangements and of urban regions of
various sizes  but functioning under similar arrangements (cf. also  Yin 1994). The following cities
were ultimately chosen  (see Table 1).
1. Athens 9. Dresden
2. Barcelona 10. Dublin
17.MannheimiHeidelberg/
Ludwigshafen
18. Oslo
3 . Berlin ll. Hagelanden 19 . Paris
4 . Bern 12 . Hanover 20. Rome
5 . Bordeaux 13 . London 2 1. Stockholm
6 . Brussels 14. Leeds 22. Vienna
7 . Budapest 15. Lisbon
8 . Copenhagen 1 ó.Malmö/Lund/ Helsingborg
Table 1. List of selected European case cities
For each  city in this list the set of performance (success)  indicators included in Figure 5 has been
assessed in a qualitative (categorical)  form by using local expert information (see for details Van
Egmond 2001). These scores are based on the degree of fulfïlment  of objectives included in Figure 5.
The centra1 objective  is usage  of urban mass transit systems, as a result of the various background
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factors included in this figure. An expert summation of al1 these individual performance criteria may
then lead to a comprehensive score for the LPT success according to the following trichotomic
classification of the performance of a given LPT system in any  of these cities: successful (score 1);
moderately succes&1 (score 2); unsuccessful (score 3); unknown success receives  a code 4. The
actual performance assessments based on reports, articles, yearbooks, research, intemet and casual
interviews can be found in the first row (P) of Table 3.
To map out  in a categorical  form the CSCs  for each  city a codilïed qualitative information table
has to be deployed (see Table 2.). Next, empirical estimates of al1 18 factors determining the CSCs
have been made for al1 22 European case cities, again based on various local information sources on
LPT. With the help of extensive comparative  fieldwork  the codification included in Table 2 has been
assessed for each  individual city. The empirically estimated information is contained  in Table 3 under
the headings A through D. The information in the latter table wil1 now be treated in two steps. First,
we wil1 offer a qualitative interpretation of the results, based on an analysis of frequenties  of CSCs  in
this matrix. Next, we wil1 deploy a new multivariate classifïcation method for nomina1 measurement
scales,  coined rough set analysis.
6. Empirical Results
A qualitative inspection of the coded  data matrix (Table 3) offers already  quite some interesting
insights. The performance scores in Table 3 demonstrate that from our sample of 22 European cities at
least 5 cities are regarded as having an unsuccessful operation of their LPT systems. A moderate
success is claimed by 9 cities, while a good performance can apparently be found in 7 cities. For one
city the performance of its LPT systems could not be unambiguously defined.  So the genera1 fïnding is
that the present conditions of a European policy of limited competition has led to rather  successful
outcomes, since a total of 16 cities out  of 22 cases has moderately to high successful  LPT systems
(measured in terms of an increase in the use of LPT).
From the set of 22 cities a total of 16 may be considered as cases of limited competition, the
dominant organizational form of EU LPT systems. From these 16 cases, a total of 10 may be
interpreted as based on initiative by the public authority, while the remaining ones  represent an
initiative by the market (or an ambiguous case). In general,  these cases appear to yield rather
promising results. Thus, one may conclude that the adoption of a specific  organizational-institutional
form of LPT based on limited competition provides  the conditions for a balance between the socio-
politica1 objectives  of sound socio-economie and financial-economie  development of LPT systems.
If we make a distinction into extemal, strategie,  tactical and operational background conditions for
the performance of LPT systems, then we arrive at the following genera1 conclusion on their impact on
the LPT performance.
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D2 Priorities of LPT Yes N O Unknown
with respect to
other traffic
D3 Density of LPT High Average Low Unknown
D4 Integration of High Average Low Unknown
L P T
D5 LPT marketing High Average Low Unknown
and information
‘able 2. The codifïed table for the CSCs of LPT systems
1 1
EUROPEAN CASE CITIES
CSCs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
P 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 12 13 2 14 1 2 3 2 12 2 1
Al 1 1 1 4 3 2 2 2 3 2 3 3 12 3 2 3 2 12 2 2
A 2 2 11 3 3 1 1 1  2 2 111 2 2 3 2 2 2 13 1
1A3 12 12 12 12 11 12 l2 i2 l2 ,2  ,l  ,l  ,2  ,2 ,l  ,l ,l ,2 ,2  ,2  ,2 ,2 ,
A 4 2 2 12 2 2 11 2 12 12 2 12 11 2 2 11
Bl 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 12 2 1111 2 2 2  1 1 1 1 1
B2 2 2 12 11 4 2 12 11 2 12 2 12 2 12  3
B 3 2 1 1 1 2 12 12 2 12 2 12 2 2 11 2 13
B4 2 12 12 12 11 12 11 12 12 11 1 1 2
C l 12 2 11 3 2 2 2 3 3 2 2 6 6 2 2 2 4 12 3
c2 12 2 3 3 11 2 2 3 2 2 2 12 12 12 2 2 2
c3 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 2 3 1.3 2 4 4 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3
c4 11 3 4 4 13 4 4 4 5 3 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 12 4
c 5 13 11 2 111 2 2 2 3 3 1 2  3  2  1 1 1 1 1
D l 2 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 14 13 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
D2 12 13 13 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 13 12 3 11 3
D3 2 2 12 3 2 2 11 2 2 12 4 2 14 11 2 2 2
D4 3 11 2 3 1111 2 12 2 3 3 2 1 1 1 2 1 1
D5 2 12 3 3 4 3 2 12 4 13 2 3 2 4 14 14 2
Table 3. The coded  data base on performance (P) and CSCs (A, B, C, D) of European LPT systems
The external  factors do not appear to exert an unambiguous impact on the success scores of LPT.
Although these are some clear links with some of the constituents of the external factors, the overall
result is inconclusive.
For the strategie  factors we observe a more straightforward influence on the success score of LPT.
In particular, the quality of govemance and management appears to be a decisive positive factor (e.g.,
for Bern and Paris). On the other hand, overorganization of the LPT Systems leads most likely to a
failure.
At the tuctical  leve1 we also  observe interesting fïndings. In particular, cities with an LPT system
govemed by regulated or limited competition appear to yield a good performance. This should also  be
reflected in a sound division of financial responsibilities of al1 stakeholders, especially in the context
of a gross tost contract or a clear management contract. Furthermore, it appears that high subsidies for
LPT systems lead to an unsatisfactory fïnancial and socio-economie performance, while moderate
subsidies appear to yield in genera1 good results. Clearly, marked incentives do stimulate the
performance of LPT systems.
And fïnally,  at the operutional  leve1 we find that the presence of an integrated LPT system with
different modalities tend to offer a better performance.
We may conclude that there is not a single, preponderant and unambiguous performance cause  for
LPT systems. Our cases demonstrate clearly that the success (or failure) has a multidimensional
causality structure.  This means  that we have to investigate also  the simultaneous occurrence of
combinations of the four above mentioned critical success conditions. This wil1 be done in the next
stage of our analysis.
In the second  place,  we wil1 now use a recently developed qualitative classification method, viz.
rough set analysis,  to extract new insights from  the nomina1 data in Table 3. We have a data base of 22
cases (i.e., cities) each  characterised by a performance indicator (or nomina1 value of a success
indicator). Furthermore, the discriminatory score of this performance indicator is ‘explained’ by the
nomina1 values of the CSCs  in our codified  table, subdivided into four main categories  (extemal,
strategie,  tactical and operational). Each  of these categories  is subdivided into subcategories, so that
altogether we have 18 explanatory factors. Thus,  we have to explain the nomina1 expression for a
success factor regarding the performance of LPT systems fì-om an underlying set of nomina1
expressions for CSCs.  It is clear that, even apart from  the smal1 sample of 22 cities, this is statistically
an impossible task due to the low leve1 of measurement (i.e., nomina1 data).
Nevertheless, our codifïed  information table may represent a latent structure  through which the
value of a performance indicator may yet be explained by means  of combinatorial logie.  In this
context, the use of techniques from  artifïcial intelligente,  in particular rough set analysis, may be
helpful.  Rough set methods are multivariate classification methods that aim to detect  pattems in a data
base, even in the case of low measurement scales  (including nomina1 scales).  They are not based on
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conventional statistics,  but on the identifïcation of deterministic rules (or statements) that are
supported by the data base at hand.
Such  rules often take the form of ‘ijI..then’  statements and reveal under which conditions (i.e.,
combinations of values of the explanatory variables in the data base) a certain score on the dependent
variable is valid. Thus, the result of a rough set analysis is a series of deterministic statements
(‘decision rules’) of an ‘if.. . then’ nature.  If a certain variable shows up in al1 conditional statements, it
offers apparently an explanatory contribution in al1 cases. Such  a variable is called a ‘core’.  In this
deterministic way relevant critical success  factors  can be identified.
We wil1 now present the conditional statements which emerge from  the application of a rough set
analysis to the above data base (using the ROSE software programme). This application of rough set
methods leads to the following 7 decision rules,  i.e. conditional statements which explain under which
conditions (values of CSCs)  a certain performance score is realized.
l)-rP=2
(i). (B2 =2)  & (C4=4)  & (C5=3)  -) P=l
(ii). (C4=4)  & (D3=2)  --f  P=l
(iii). (A3=2)  & (C1=2)  & (D1=5)  & (D4=
(iv). (D5=1)  + P=2
(v). (Al=2) & (B1=2)  & (C2=1)  --)  P=2
(vi). (A3=1)  & (B2=1)  & (C5=2)  + P=3
(vii). (C2=1)  & (D4=3)  + P=3
These results show that there is no core  (i.e., a common factor in each  of these decision rules),
although the accuracy of the approximation in this set of rules  appears to be high. Essentially there are
many reducts  that provide  an optimal representation of this multivariate classification. Attributes with
a relatively high frequency in these reducts  appear to be A2, A3, B2, B4, Cl, D3 and D5,  with the
highest frequency for D5.
The various decision rules  specifïed above can be interpreted in a straightforward way. Let US
take as an example tule  (vii), which states that a failure of a LPT system (i.e., P=3)  may be the result
of a combination of a fïnancial framework based on a net tost contract (i.e., C2=1)  and a very  low
leve1 of integration within the LPT system concemed (i.e., D4=3).
These decision rules look rather  complex, but can in various cases be interpreted in a straight-
forward way. For example, tule  (i) claims that a successful  LPT system may emerge when  there is a
specific,  customized and non-overloaded regulartory regime and when  the privileged position of LPT
systems is so strong, that no public-private partnership is necessary. Similarly, tule  (ii) stipulates that,
with a fair density of LPT systems, such that no complementary support mechanisms in the form of
public-private partnership are needed, the LPT system concemed tends  to be successful.  Another
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example concerns rule (iv) which states that a medium success of LPT systems may already  be
expected with an intensive effort regarding marketing and information. An example of a failing
performance can be found in rule (vii) which claims that a combination of a financial constellation
based on a net tost contract and a low integration leve1 of LPT systems tends  to lead to a low success.
7. Concluding Remarks
The necessary rise in efficiency and service provision in LPT systems requires a drastic  reform in
the organsation of urban mass transit systems. Such  a regulatory transformation needs  a closer
orientation towards market principles in which delivery of high quality service to paying customers
forms a crucial objective.  This regulatory reform should also  respect the peculiarities of LPT systems,
such  as its public nature,  the indivisibility of parts of the infrastructure and the high fixed costs.
Consequently, a shit?  towards mainly limited forms of competition seems to be plausible.
In our study, the success conditions for LPT systems in 22 European cities have been
investigated. It turns out  that these critical success factors  can be subdivided into four categories,  viz.
external, strategie,  tactical and operational. From these classes of conditions, in particular the strategie,
tactical and operational factors  appear to exert  a major influence.
In general,  the regulatory reform of public transport has created new challenges and also  new
opportunities for a more successful  functioning of these systems. Our comparative  analysis has
demonstrated that in the past years - despite variation - many European cities have managed to
organize their LPT systems in a more efficient  and satisfactory way.
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